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China and U. S. Asian Policy

Moderator, JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.

Speakers

WALTER H. JUDD

ERNEST A. GROSS

HARRY F. KERN



—COMING—

—March 23, 1954—


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THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

REPRESENTATIVE WALTER H. JUDD—Republican of Minnesota; member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Walter Judd was born in a Nebraska country town in 1898 and worked on the farm during the summer until he went to college. He worked his way through the University Medical School, interrupting his education to serve in World War I.

In 1925 Dr. Judd went to China as a medical missionary under the Foreign Mission Board of the Congregational Church. He built, organized, and for five years managed the 35-bed hospital in North China. He returned to the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, for post graduate study in surgery from 1932-34. Then he went back to China where for four years he was Superintendent of a 125-bed hospital in North China. He and his staff brought the hospital through a Communist revolution and the Japanese invasion.

Five months after the invasion of China by Japan, he returned to spend 1939 and 1940 speaking throughout the U. S., in an attempt to arouse Americans to the menace of Japan's military expansion and to get embargoes on sale and shipment of war materials to Japan.

After Pearl Harbor, many individuals and groups representing all segments of the community urged Dr. Judd to become a candidate for Congress from the Fifth Minnesota District. He was elected in 1942, and re-elected to succeeding Congresses.

In Congress he has served on a Joint Committee to study reports of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and as a member of Foreign Affairs sub-committee has made investigation and study trips to Europe and Asia.

HARRY F. KERN—Senior Editor, International Affairs, *Newsweek* magazine. Harry F. Kern is Senior Editor for International Affairs and editor-in-chief of *Newsweek* magazine's International Editions. Among these are the Pacific editions which are published in Tokyo.

Mr. Kern joined *Newsweek* in 1935 after his graduation from Harvard University. Since that date he has personally investigated, researched and reported for *Newsweek* readers news in the international fields.

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China and U. S. Asian Policy

Announcer:

Tonight's Town Meeting comes to you from Horace Greeley High School in Chappaqua, New York, under the auspices of the Chappaqua Forum on Foreign Relations. The Forum of Foreign Relations is sponsored by the Chappaqua Adults' School in the interest of keeping the people abreast with the current actions and policies of other countries. This series, now in its second year, brings to Chappaqua three experts each week for ten weeks. These speakers present, discuss, and explain the culture, aims, and policies of selected countries.

This year, the Foreign Relations Series is concentrating on three areas: the European Defense Community, the Arab-Moslem Civilization, and China. For his outstanding efforts in initiating and successfully directing the Forum last year, Mr. Charles Taylor, a Social Studies teacher at Horace Greeley High School, was awarded a citation as "Citizen of the Year" by a local civic group. Town Meeting is indeed happy to be a part of the Foreign Relations Forum of Chappaqua. We wish it continued success in the years ahead.

Now to preside over our discussion, here is our moderator, Mr. James F. Murray, Jr. Mr. Murray.

Moderator Murray:

The vast power vacuum created in Asia by the collapse of Japan and the fall of Nationalist China presented the United States with a foreign policy dilemma no less formidable than Soviet aggression in Europe. We could either abandon East Asia to Moscow and Peking or we could attempt

to stem the Red tide by expanding our intervention in Far Eastern affairs to encompass diplomatic, financial, and military commitments hardly ever contemplated by this nation.

Communist strategy in Asia since World War II is said by some experts to include three principle objectives: First, the control of China's unlimited manpower—an objective which has been achieved, with the sole exception of Chiang's armies on Formosa; secondly, the control of Japanese industrial potential which was thwarted by our defense of Korea and by continuing measures, such as the Mutual Security Agreement announced in today's headlines; and, perhaps lastly, control of the great resources in raw material deposits of Indo-China and Southeast Asia, where the bitter conflict now rages in its seventh year of indecision.

Behind the impressive territorial gains and political victories of communism in East Asia looms the colossus of Red China. Scarcely more than five weeks remain before this architect of aggression and tension in the Far East again moves to the conference table, this time at Geneva.

Tonight, realizing that our policy decisions on China and all Asia will affect free society perhaps for generations to come, America's Town Meeting has invited three of the most distinguished American experts on Asian affairs to discuss the question: "China and the U. S. Asian Policy."

Our first speaker is the distinguished member of Congress, Representative Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Representative Judd.

Congressman Judd:

Mr. Moderator, nobody will now deny that the conquest of China by the communists was a veritable disaster to the security of the United States and to our European allies and to the free world. The question is what can and should the United States do now to try to retrieve the situation? First, I think we must recognize frankly that it is the security, even the survival, of the free world including ourselves that is at stake in Asia.

Second, the immediate objective of our policy must be to prevent any further gains or victories by the Kremlin—military, economic or diplomatic. Third, in addition to keeping the free world free, we must find ways and means to help the enslaved world become free. We must not build up the oppressors by giving official recognition to the communists or admitting them to the United Nations, thereby increasing their prestige, their influence, and their power in the world.

Fourth, we must also keep the Chinese Communists in economic trouble at home by resisting resumption of trade with them. If they are not our enemies, why do we draft and prepare men to fight them? If they are our enemies, how can anyone seriously suggest we do anything to make them stronger?

Fifth, we must give greater encouragement and assistance to the free Chinese on Formosa and elsewhere, not for an attempted mass invasion of the Chinese mainland but to enable them to smuggle agents and suitable supplies to the mainland, to keep hope alive and to enable the resistance forces to do to the Reds exactly what the Reds did for years to the Nationalists—destroy communications,

isolate the cities, disrupt the economy.

Sixth, the only way we can really gain security in Asia is by weakening, loosening, and eventually breaking the hold of the communist regime in China. To break Communist China would immediately remove all serious danger to the rest of East and South Asia. Until Communist China is broken, no measures in those areas are likely to have lasting success.

And lastly, our strongest and most dependable ally in this world's struggle and the one most able to do the enemy real harm is the oppressed peoples behind the iron curtain. America must put her faith in these peoples and not in cynical deals with the tyrant.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Congressman Judd. Now, our second speaker this evening, Mr. Ernest A. Gross, former U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Mr. Gross:

Mr. Murray, a recent report of a United Nations agency has said that the situation in Asia remains grave. The merest stabilization of misery is not enough. There are countries in this group which have an annual life expectancy in the population of 25 years. The annual income in many of these countries is \$50 a year. The literacy rate is 5 to 10 per cent. These are figures which are hard for us to understand and accept, but they are true of hundreds of millions of people in the areas of Asia.

Now, in dealing with the problem of communism, I think it can be agreed upon by all of us that anti-communism is hardly enough, that to hungry people anti-communism is a diet of very thin soup. The problem of dealing with the situation of keeping Asia free and building freedom where it is no

now free, it seems to me, is based fundamentally on several important economic and political facts.

In the first place, we must, as has been repeatedly said, raise our voices loudly in support of land reform. General McArthur in Japan, the Premier of Formosa, Mr. Nehru in India, all have realized the importance of eliminating the vicious land tenancy system in countries where fifty per cent of the crop is taken for rent, sixty per cent interest is paid on fertilizer and seed and grocery allowance. The voice of America may be heard or it may not, but the whisper of communism will be heard.

We must, it seems to me, understand the mentality of the Asians, who have just recently left behind them what they consider, I think very properly, the evils of colonialism from which they suffer a hangover at the present time. There, again, it is certainly consistent with our own traditions to understand the importance of recognizing the national aspirations, the independence aspirations, of these hundreds of millions of people.

And finally, it seems to me, by far the most important ingredient is the very decisive necessity of building our leadership on moral unity and strength, which means a strong, united United States of America and not divided and not fearful, and a spiritual regeneration which moral unity always brings with it.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Mr. Gross. Now, our third guest this evening is Mr. Harry F. Kern, Senior Editor, International Affairs, of *Newsweek* magazine, who has just returned from Japan. Mr. Kern.

Mr. Kern:

Mr. Murray, as an editor, I like to deal with facts, but I fear that in discussing the present situation

in the Far East, and in particular what we can do about it, the facts are few and far between. There are some very simple ones, such as those cited by Representative Judd, that a Communist China is a menace to the security of the United States. But, for example, what are the relations between Red China and Russia?

For years, we have tried through every channel we can employ, and there are many, to obtain some authentic information. The Indians don't know; the British don't know; and we don't know. Yet nothing could be more vital in the formulation of our policies than knowledge of the state of relations between Peiping and Moscow. I am sure that in the course of the discussions this evening we will run into many of these immensely important enigmas, but there are a few facts that appear to me basic in any discussion of the Far East.

The first is the necessity of making it quite clear that we do not intend to allow the military expansion of a fanatical nationalist Communist China. The second is to make it quite clear that we do not regard this China as the true China, and that the true China can live in peace with the West. The third is an appreciation of the importance of holding Southeast Asia, and of the means that may be used to this end.

The fourth, and not least in importance, is to understand the pivotal, central position of Japan and appreciate the forces that may impel it to join a communist Asia. If we can keep these fundamental facts clear in our head, then we may understand the problem in Asia; and, understanding it, we may be able to deal with it.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Mr. Kern. Gentlemen, and

merely as a point of orientation, may I inquire of all of you, do you feel that at the present moment the United States has a realistic and consistent foreign policy with respect to Asia, and particularly with respect to China? Mr. Gross.

Mr. Gross: I did not mention China in my opening remarks. May I say a word about that in response to your question? It seems to me our policy with regard to China is realistic. We have supported, and continue to support, the Nationalist Chinese representative in the United Nations, where I am glad to say there is no present prospect, at least, that he will be replaced. He has made a great contribution and I think his country deserves to remain where it is.

I do believe that negotiation with the Chinese Communists, however, on issues in which we consider it to be in our national interest, is a sound and realistic policy, and I, therefore, would support the holding of the Geneva Conference, since I consider it to be in our interest to negotiate with the source of aggression in Korea.

I do not favor recognition of Communist China; I do not think that negotiation involves recognition. I believe that the moral effect of recognizing Communist China would be very great. I do not think we should confer that moral and political effect upon them, but I don't believe we should shut our eyes to the practical necessity of negotiating with them on issues in which it is to our national interest to do so.

Mr. Murray: Congressman Judd.

Congressman Judd: That's exactly the policy that we have been developing step by step. Geneva is a continuation of Panmunjom. After all, we have been at war

with these people. The danger is not in the facts of the matter. The danger is that some people interpret the very holding of a conference in Geneva as somehow an act of recognition, on an official basis, that gives them legitimacy and respectability. Our government or our people don't do a good job at propaganda, shall I say, or hammering away at the truth of the matter.

As Mr. Dulles said, "The Chinese Communists are in Geneva before the bar of public opinion as declared aggressors in this Korean War." It doesn't mean that we are marrying them or that we are conferring upon them respectability, and that ought to be understood, because if people get to thinking that it is recognition, it, to that extent, becomes much harder to combat.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, in essence, what is the conflict in Asia? Is it a struggle for the minds of men? Mr. Gross.

Mr. Gross: I think it is a struggle for the minds and bodies of men. I think communism, of course, controls the individual and destroys the individual. It does seem to me that the facts that I have mentioned regarding the conditions prevailing among the population provide a key to the answer. The grounds for subversion exist in Asia. On the other hand, I think it is a mistake to dismiss large areas and large populations on the ground that "oh, well, they're neutralist. They aren't willing to stand up and be counted. Therefore, we should write them off." I think that's a mistake.

I would like to refer to just two sentences from a speech by Nehru, who is regarded by many as the arch-neutralist—the speech he made just a week or so ago to

the voters in the state of Travancore in India. He said, "The whole basis of the Communist Party is all wrong. Their entire thinking is based on something outside India."

Well it is true that from many points of view we are disappointed—that India has not, for example, supplied troops to Korea, and taken other action which we believe is fully justified. But to say they are neutral, against us, or to say they are in favor of communism seems to me to do them an injustice, and, therefore, to do ourselves an injustice.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Gross. Mr. Kern, you have just returned recently from the Orient. How do the other Asians look upon Communist China, in your opinion?

Mr. Kern: I would say, particularly in Japan—I think this is true throughout Asia—they really haven't the faintest idea what it is. They may learn, and I believe that is really one of the great fundamental problems in dealing with Asia, to somehow educate them as to the true meaning of communism. Some Japanese think, for example, that they might be able to join the other side and maintain their central Japanese identity, and not go down beneath the curtain.

You can see their reasoning as something like this: They say, "We were occupied by the Americans for six or seven years and we emerge more Japanese than ever. What can the Russians do to us that the Americans didn't?" You may laugh at it, but there it is. If you go down to Indo-China, I don't think there is any doubt whatever, if a free election were held in Indo-China, the communists

would win it. You have a great problem of education there.

Mr. Murray: Congressman Judd.

Congressman Judd: I was with a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Asia twice last year, and we went through all these countries that border on China, from Japan and Korea clear around to India and Pakistan. I would sum up my impressions of the people, particularly the leaders of those countries, in this general way.

One, overwhelmingly now, as contrasted with a few years ago, they're awake to the danger of communism. The one unadulterated benefit of the war in Korea was that it tied up the Chinese Communists in Korea for three years, and during that time the truth about what happened in Communist China leaked out.

Second, those people are opposed to communism, less perhaps in Japan than almost anywhere else because they haven't actually been up against it yet. They are opposed to it because they know now what it will do to their most treasured possession, their national independence. For centuries, some of them fought to get freedom from alien control and they know now that Communist control means alien control, along the lines that Mr. Gross gave from Nehru.

Third, overwhelmingly, they want to be on the side of the free world, because that is the only way they can really develop their nationalism. But lastly, and this is what really jars me, they have a haunting uncertainty as to the steadfastness or the constancy of American policy. They have a fear that if they take a strong stand against communism, and abandon their neutral attitude, we may go to a big conference and Molotov

present a big package deal and we take it at their expense.

The great question mark in Asia today is the steadfastness of the United States, at least in their minds, and that tells me what we have to do with our foreign policy. Get one that is consistent and make it clear to them, and then stand by it. I think overwhelmingly they will be on our side now, as they wouldn't have two or three years ago, when they were entranced with the idea that communism was a great agrarian reform.

Mr. Murray: Do you have a comment, Mr. Gross?

Mr. Gross: Yes, I would like to underscore one point that Walter Judd has made. Of course national unity here is an indispensable ingredient as well. But in regard to the point, however, that I did want to mention, whether or not a free election in Indo-China would result in a success for the communists, I would hesitate very much to agree to that. Communists have not won a free election anywhere.

At the same time, it is true that one of the basic difficulties in the Indo-China situation is that, unlike Korea, it does not have, should I say, moral support of the free world generally, because, unlike Korea, it has not been permitted to come within the purview of the United Nations. Now, I do not know myself how far it would be practical or appropriate for the U.N. to get into the Indo-China thing.

I am struck by the fact, however, that the U.N. Peace Observation Commission, for example, which has been called the eyes and ears of the U.N., has no observers there. So if the Red Chinese armies should come in in force,

or come in with borrowed uniforms, or come in any other way, we in the U.N. would not have the value of a report from any trusted agency of the United Nations as to the facts. We did have that in Korea, and it helped mobilize at least moral unity very quickly—in a matter of hours—not days.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Kern, did you wish to give some further facts on that opinion of yours concerning elections in Indo-China?

Mr. Kern: As I remarked in the beginning, facts are few and far between here. You see Representative Judd already has one set and I have another, and I'm sure we get them both from very good sources. The French, however, in Indo-China, I'm quite sure, have no intention of holding free elections and they are very frankly telling you why—they'd lose them.

Mr. Murray: Well, do you attribute that largely to the strong nationalism which exists and the feeling for nationalism, or is it Communist propaganda, or perhaps a combination of the two?

Mr. Kern: I think at the moment the communists are certainly putting out a better propaganda there than we are. You get Asians as Representative Judd so truly remarked, wanting to play both sides until they know which is going to be on top.

Congressman Judd: And we can't blame them for that, because there are plenty of people in America saying that Communism won, recognize them, let's be practical and accept them. We can't expect them to be more mature and more steadfast and intelligent than we ourselves are.

But to come back to this Indo-China thing, our big problem there is something like this. Last spring

you couldn't really ask the Viet Nameese to fight for a country they weren't going to have. Now the French are really going the whole way in making clear that French colonialism is ended, and the Viet Nameese told us that the French can't turn back on this.

But now it is pretty hard to ask the French to fight for a colony that they aren't going to have, and yet those two have got to work together with American assistance or that area will be taken over by the communists from within. If that happens, then I tell you the problem of holding the rest of Southeast Asia becomes almost impossible.

Mr. Gross: I'd like to mention this to Walter. I have been in France recently, spent some months there. I think it would be safe to say that the average Frenchman (we are kicking the French around too much on this thing; they have made tremendous sacrifices there in the last six years), it seems to me the average Frenchman would have great pride, with reason, in what the French have done in Indo-China. We can see some weaknesses and difficulties in the situation there, but the question in my mind is how we strengthen the situation.

And I think one of the first things we should do is to support a strong, general, moral political effort throughout the world. I think we ought to convince, and help the French convince, other countries in Asia that what's going on in Indo-China is part of the struggle for the maintenance of freedom there, and I believe the United Nations could help in that respect. I regret that the United Nations has not played a role of any kind in that problem.

Congressman Judd: Hasn't that

been because the French didn't want it brought up before the United Nations? I appealed in Congress twice for this great issue being brought to the United Nations, as was the Korean invasion in June, 1950, but it was always resisted from somewhere. I agree that it is a mistake now for us to go along beating the dead horse of French colonialism. The problem is to see this thing in the large, and help the French to see this as a matter of national pride and as a necessity for maintaining the French Union and France remaining a great world power.

They've got to think not in terms of saving a colony that's gone, but in terms of saving a free world. If they have a free world in Asia, that's the thing that's best and most useful to France and to ourselves and all other free peoples. I think the French are likely to surprise a great many of their detractors and rise to greatness and pull out of the shock in which they have been in most of these recent years.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, in a few weeks, of course, the world will witness the Geneva Conference, and I wonder if you would venture opinions as to what we might expect as a maximum or perhaps as a minimum from that conference with respect to Red China and the general problem of Asia. Mr. Gross?

Mr. Gross: Well, I don't mean to sound cynical, but there's an old joke about the fellow who was a chronic gambler at the horse races who lost everything. One day he came home with a smile, and his wife asked him why he was happy, and he said he broke even and how he needed it! I think the Geneva Conference, I don't want to sound cynical, but I think we will do well if we break even.

Mr. Murray: Do you agree with that, Mr. Kern?

Mr. Kern: No, I'm rather more hopeful about the Geneva Conference. I think we have probably felt the worst effects of it already. It's had a very bad effect in Indo-China and a bad effect in Japan already, and I think to that extent whatever bad may come out of it has been discounted. One thing we will get out of it is to examine the relations between Russia and China, because, in effect, Molotov will be playing second fiddle to Mao. I think that is going to be very illuminating and a very profitable thing for us to witness.

Congressman Judd: I think it was the only thing we could do, although I hold my breath. When any of us get into the ring with those professionals, we are taking on something for which we are not really trained.

But at the same time, our principles are sound, and if we go there hoping we can get an agreement as the maximum objective, but if we can't, then at least make it everlastingly clear that it is they who are blocking the agreement. I have sufficient faith in our principles that if we talk about them and lay them on the table, but don't accept just promises as substitute for deeds and don't make any agreements under the table that sacrifice our principles or other peoples' territory, or rights or freedom, that those principles ultimately will prevail. And I think we are going to come out of this better than a lot of the pessimists expect.

Mr. Gross: I think, Walter, that that is right, but the point of it is, I'm afraid that there is no evidence whatever that the Soviets have changed their stripes in any way. Malenkov is playing the same

broken records that Stalin played. It seems to me—and of course this is what I meant by my comment before—that the closest co-ordination exists between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and they will not settle in Korea until they are ready to abandon their policy of the iron curtain, and there is no indication whatever that they are willing to do so.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, each week Town Meeting presents a handsome twenty-volume set of the American People's Encyclopedia to a listener who submits the most provocative and timely question pertinent to the subject under discussion.

Tonight's question comes from Mrs. William E. Jackson of Teaneck, N. J. Mrs. Jackson's question to you is this: "How much validity is there in the theory that Russia is actually working to keep China out of the United Nations, economically dependent on Moscow, and isolated from the West, so that she will be dependent upon Moscow for all interpretations of world events?" Which one of you would care to reply first to Mrs. Jackson's question?

Congressman Judd: I don't think there is anything to it. I wish it were true, and I'd like to oblige her by keeping the communists just as closely in the bear's hug as possible and not helping them out of it. The quickest way to get a break between Peiping and Moscow is to keep them dependent upon each other and not let Mao have all the advantages of being with the Russians and all the advantages of being accepted into the free world as a respectable member of it.

It just isn't credible that the Kremlin would be working its head off, day in and day out, will-

ing to sacrifice almost anything to get Communist China into the United Nations if that was going to break up the great brotherly love and partnership. Look at the papers coming out of Peiping today, announcing the very holding of this conference in Geneva as a tremendous victory for them. The communists, whatever they are, are not fools, and they wouldn't be trying to get China into the United Nations if that would be a death blow to themselves.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Gross.

Mr. Gross: Well, I think famous last words have included, "I know what the Communists want to do." But I think it is perfectly clear that the question of what the seeds of conflict and friction are between the Soviet Union and Communist China are clear. There are seeds of friction. I believe, however, that they will and are working in close alliance and will continue to do so

so long as the elements of common imperialist aggression are greater than the seeds of disagreement between them.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Kern.

Mr. Kern: I wish I knew the answer to that question. But I think it is clear that there has been a certain change in Russian policy during the past six months. All their efforts are directed now toward getting China into a big power meeting, later into the U.N. They have changed their signals and have put that as their number one task.

They have done it in all their official notes to us; they did it in Berlin. Whatever their motives may be, we can only judge by their actions. Their actions certainly indicate this is a number one feature of Russian policy.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Kern.



QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, we have now come to our question period in America's Town Meeting wherein our questioners direct their inquiries to our three guests. May I ask that you keep your questions brief and tell us to whom your question is directed. We will take the first question from the gentleman on my left.

Questioner: Congressman Judd, you quoted Mr. Dulles as saying that Communist China would be before the bar of public opinion at Geneva. Do you think they will come with that attitude?

Congressman Judd: No, I know the communists will not come with that attitude. They will try to

make a victory out of that which is actually a failure to get a victory. Lenin said, "Whenever you have to retreat, you must camouflage it as an advance and whenever you have to accept a defeat, make it look like a victory." So, of course, they will come with that idea in mind.

And to go back, if I could, to the last thing Mr. Kern said. Why shouldn't they want to make it look as if Communist China had been recognized? Because that gives them victory in Asia. Once the people of Asia see Communist China recognized, why should anyone expect them to go out and jump in front of the express train?

Recognition of Communist China gives them Asia within a very few months or years without any war. Why shouldn't that be their number one objective, and why shouldn't it be our determined objective to see that it doesn't happen?

Mr. Murray: The next question from the gentleman with the brown coat, please.

Questioner: Mr. Gross, is there not a good chance that by recognition we could eventually infiltrate the country and supplant Russian influence?

Mr. Gross: No, I don't think so. Recognition in the case of the British who have recognized has not had that result. I don't believe that is really the question, at least as it impresses itself upon me. It seems to me the question is whether recognition is more or less likely to bring about a change in the Chinese Communist policy—to bring them into compliance with international status of behavior—than our present course. I believe that recognition would *not* bring them into compliance, but would, on the other hand, encourage them in their present lawless course.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Gross, and the next question from the young lady.

Questioner: Mr. Kern, these other two men have given their opinion, and what is your reaction to the West's invitation to Communist China to attend the conference at Geneva?

Mr. Kern: I don't think that Mr. Dulles had much choice. If he did not accept the invitation on the terms which he extracted from Mr. Molotov, the French Government would almost certainly have fallen, and we would have had to give up all hope of E.D.C. with French participation. That would

have meant facing immediately the decision to rearm Germany by ourselves, and we are doing our best not to do that. We may have to, but at least this is the last chance for France, and that is the real meaning of Geneva.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Kern. This young lady, please.

Questioner: Congressman Judd could our recognition of Red China possibly have a good effect on our relation with Soviet Russia?

Congressman Judd: Well, I don't see how it could possibly have any good effect on our relations with Soviet Russia, because that would make them stronger and us weaker. That certainly wouldn't make them in a more docile or friendly mood. I cannot find one possibly good result conceivable from recognition of Communist China and, therefore, the Russians obviously want it because it will help them and weaken us and weaken our allies and those on the fence and discourage the people behind the iron curtain.

There is plenty of reason to know that there is restlessness in the satellite countries in Europe and behind the curtain in China. Let's keep that restlessness going and not sell out those who basically are on our side.

Mr. Murray: The next question please.

Questioner: Mr. Gross, would it be legally possible for both the Nationalist and Communist Governments of China to participate in the U.N.?

Mr. Gross: No, it would not because the question is who is the lawful representative of the Republic of China. The member of the United Nations under the United Nations Charter is the Republic of China, and the Nationalist

ist Government is the last freely elected government of China. Its representative sits in the U.N. because the members of the U.N. consider he is entitled to be there. You can not have both of them because they would conflict with each other, and there would be rival claimants speaking for the same country, which would be very impracticable and impossible.

Mr. Murray: Next question, please.

Questioner: Mr. Kern, I believe you said that the United States must make it clear to Communist China that no further military expansion will be allowed in Asia. Does this not ultimately mean that we must be prepared actively to intervene in Indo-China?

Mr. Kern: No, it does not mean that at all. What it does mean and what was made clear to the Chinese, at least we hope it was, was that if the Chinese intervened in a decisive way in Indo-China, we would retaliate against them in other places — that is, in China proper. It is one of the greatest worries of Mr. Dulles, just whether or not he got this idea across.

I think it is fairly evident by now that the idea has been got across and that the Chinese do not intend to intervene in Indo-China or Korea. We are now entering a new period, where their prime objective is trade.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Kern. A question from the gentleman on my right, please.

Questioner: I want to ask Mr. Gross, do you think that the United Nations will be able to obtain the goal of world peace by keeping Red China out of U.N.?

Mr. Gross: The United Nations, I think, cannot obtain a goal of world peace unless the members

of the United Nations let it do that. Now, the question isn't what the United Nations can obtain; it's what the Soviet Union and other members of the U.N. let it do, and how they use it as an instrument to obtain world peace. I do not believe that the presence of Red China in United Nations would make it any more of a peace instrument than it is today.

The Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations, but it is obstructing and thwarting the United Nations from the standpoint of accomplishing the peaceful objective. Now, I think the Russians are not in a position to prevent us from using the United Nations for economic programs, to build a great deal of morale and political sentiment and rally the free world in a great many ways, but I do not think it eliminates the Soviet danger to have them a member of the United Nations.

I do not think it would eliminate the danger from Communist China by having them a member of the United Nations. They've got to change their policy; they've got to change their course of conduct before we can have a peaceful world.

Mr. Murray: Thank you, Mr. Gross. A question from the gentleman on the aisle, please.

Questioner: I have a question for Mr. Judd. What policy should General Marshall have recommended after the war when he was in China?

Mr. Judd: Well, I must preface that by saying that General Marshall didn't recommend in the beginning. He went out there to follow orders, and he followed them faithfully. But when he saw you couldn't get the Communists together with the Nationalists, and, second, that it would be a mistake if you did, then I think

he should have recommended a policy of forthright support of our ally. In a jungle world, survival depends upon the capacity to distinguish friends from enemies.

The government of China, with all its weaknesses, was an avowed and unwavering friend of the United States—the only government in China's history committed to the West, and we kicked it in the teeth and went along with a government that was committed to our destruction and against everything we believe in and stand for.

The way to prevent the war and the disaster that befell us in Asia was to support our ally in recovering control of China instead of trying to force it into a truce whereby the communists were able to take over, same as Mr. Kern has rightly said they would take over in Viet Nam if we forced a truce there.

Mr. Gross: May I make a comment? I think the question of what was done in 1944, 1945, 1946 is always of great importance and of great interest. But I think also we should keep in mind that, by and large, the attitudes and policies followed by this government, by the United States people toward China, have been fairly bi-partisan throughout.

Now, looking back on it, when General Hurley was our Ambassador there, he, too, of course in 1944 recommended to Chiang that the communist party should be given what Ambassador Hurley called "adequate representation" in the national government. So when you talk about General Marshall, I think it is good to keep in mind that all our representatives and representatives of both parties did adopt the same policy through those years.

Congressman Judd: Well, I can't quite go along with that. It may be that General Hurley was a Republican, but the Republican Party never went along with that basic policy of appeasing in Asia. We supported the administration in Europe; we opposed communism in Europe, where the policy was to help countries keep communists out of their governments; we never went along with the policy in Asia of insisting that the governments take the communist in.

Mr. Murray: Now we have one minute more, and I'd like to take another question if I can. The gentleman on my left, please.

Questioner: Mr. Kern, are the Chinese Communists succeeding in diverting the loyalty of the individual from the family to the state?

Mr. Kern: That is a big question. If they have broken down the family system, then we will have the greatest difficulty in getting China back. If they haven't, there is great hope. But the evidence recently that is coming out of China is that they haven't, and there is developing a sullen resentment—not organized. But this is the hope for the future.

Mr. Murray: We have ten seconds. Mr. Gross, do you wish to say a final word?

Mr. Gross: There is one thing that should be stressed. The Asian leaders themselves have a great responsibility to realize that they must co-operate, that appeasement never pays but is always dangerous, and there are important international efforts which can be supported by them.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, gentlemen. I'm sorry to interrupt, but time has run out, and we appreciate your most in-

interesting discussion on America's Town Meeting this evening. Copies of our entire program, including the audience questions, are available by sending twenty-five cents

in coin to Town Meeting Bulletin, New York 36, New York. Our thanks to Charles Taylor, director of Chappaqua Forum on American Foreign Policy.



FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

Background Questions

1. Has the United States a consistent, well-defined, and realistic Asian policy?
 - a. To what extent are we committed in Asia today, and are we thoroughly aware of the foreign and domestic implications of our commitments?
 - b. Should we adopt a policy of retaliation in the event of future Communist aggression?
2. What type of action must the United States take to secure the good will of the Asian people?
 - a. Can the United States rely on material and economic succor to win their confidence or must it recognize and understand their non-economic aspirations?
 - b. Has our economic aid been too little and too late, or has it had a salutary effect on U. S.—Asian relations?
 - c. Do the Asian people regard Point IV as an attempt to buy their good will or to foster a new kind of colonialism in their lands?
 - d. Would administration of technical assistance by the United Nations be more acceptable?
3. Is the struggle in Asia essentially a struggle for the minds of men?
 - a. Have we failed to understand Asian cultures in trying too hard to see the American way of life?
 - b. Have we fully exploited the propaganda value of our own former colonial status, our fostering of Philippine independence, and our speedy reaction to aggression in Korea?
 - c. Is Communist propaganda responsible for the growing hostility toward the United States, or, is the growth of nationalism a more potent anti-Western force?
4. How do the Asian people regard Communist China?
 - a. Do they regard it as a threat to their freedom and liberty?
 - b. Or, do they look to China as an independent Asian nation, free of Western ties?
 - c. Where is the allegiance of the vast number of overseas Chinese—Formosa or the Chinese mainland?
 - d. Can Asian nations remain neutral in the Cold War or must they choose sides? In their determination to be completely free of Western domination, have they needlessly flirted with Communism?
 - e. Must the U. S. be prepared to accept "neutralism" as an Asian attitude for years to come?
- Is Mao's control over the Chinese mainland complete?
 - a. Is there any force in the world both capable and willing to dislodge the Chinese Communist regime?

- b. If yes, what is that force—Chiang's troops, the United States, etc.
 - c. If Communist control of the mainland is complete, what objective can be served by not recognizing what seems to be an irrevocable situation?
 - d. Would U.S. intelligence regarding activities within Communist China be improved through diplomatic representation?
6. How strong is the Moscow-Peiping axis?
 - a. What are the chances of driving a wedge between China and Russia? Is it to our advantage to try and do so?
 - b. Is Communist China more or less dangerous to the West within the Soviet orbit?
 7. What can we expect from the Geneva Conference?
 - a. Do we have any plan in the event the French withdraw from Indo-China?
 - b. Will the conference lead to U.S. recognition of Communist China?

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

(Continued from page 2)

In his travels to and from scenes of the world's significant events, Mr. Kern averages 25,000 miles a year. Among his many visits to Japan one is particularly outstanding in his memory. He was in Tokyo in June, 1950, to gather first-hand information on Far Eastern developments when the Korean war broke out.

For *Newsweek*, Mr. Kern functions as a reporter, executive department head and analyst of major international events.

ERNEST A. GROSS—Former U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Gross was born in New York City in 1906. After attending Harvard College and Oxford University, he was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1931.

During the summers of 1929 and 1930, Mr. Gross studied at the Geneva School of International Studies.

He began his government service in 1931 as an Assistant Legal Adviser in the Department of State. In 1934 he left the Government to become General Counsel to the Printing and Publishing Industries and in 1936 became Associate General Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers.

A Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army, Ambassador Gross in July, 1943, became Chief of the Economics Section of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department General Staff.

In May, 1946, Mr. Gross returned to civilian life and became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of Occupied Areas. He was named the Legal Adviser to the Department of State.

In January, 1949, Mr. Gross was designated as Coordinator of Foreign Assistance Programs, with responsibility for the development of the first Military Assistance Program.

From October 1949 to 1953, Mr. Gross served as Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations. During the period of this assignment, he was Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council, the Committee on Additional Measures, and United States Representative in the Peace Observation Commission. Prior to his appointment as Deputy United States Representative, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

In June, 1953, he formed a law partnership with James Nevins Hyde of New York.

Moderator: JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.—New York Attorney; International Counsel and Lecturer.